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We describe a collection of techniques whereby audiovisual or other 
recordings of significant events can be made in a way that hinders 
falsification, pre-dating, or post-dating by interested parties, even by the 
makers and operators of the recording equipment. A central feature of these 
techniques is the interplay between private information, which by its nature 
is untrustworthy and susceptible to suppression or manipulation by 
interested parties, and public information, which is too widely known to be 
manipulated by anyone.   While authenticated recordings may be infeasible 
to falsify, they can be abused in other ways, such as being used for 
blackmail or harassment; but susceptibility to these abuses can be reduced 
by encryption and secret sharing.   
 
I. The importance of video evidence and the problem of faking.  
Audiovisual documentation is becoming increasingly important in settling 
disputes. Every day it helps convict the guilty, exonerate the innocent, and 
reveal the subtleties of real world situations that interested parties may try to 
hide in biased, oversimplified verbal accounts of what happened. Perhaps 
more importantly, the mere knowledge that an A/V recording is, or might 
be, being made is a powerful disincentive to crime and abuse of power on all 
scales, depriving pickpockets and war criminals alike of the confidence that 
their misdeeds will go unrecorded and therefore unpunished. The most 
famous case of this in the US was the amateur video of Rodney King's 
beating by Los Angeles police in 1991, which led to an increased public 
awareness of police brutality and eventually to a conviction of some of the 
officers. Recent examples can be seen in the BBC news story [1] about 
amateur videos of arrests in Oklahoma and California.  Even though videos 
have been used to expose police misconduct, many police departments have 
embraced the mounting of video cameras in police cars and the routine 
videotaping of arrests, interrogations and confessions, in order to produce 
more convincing evidence and protect officers from false accusations of 
misconduct.  
Unfortunately, the same digital technology which makes today's video 
cameras small and convenient seriously undermines the reliability of their 
recordings. Given enough time, a skilled digital counterfeiter can add or 
remove persons or objects from a scene, alter the words a person speaks and 
the actions they perform, and in the end produce a realistic looking video 
that bears no resemblance to the truth. For example, Chris Bregler et al's 
Video Rewrite [2] shows how to make videos of people saying things they 
never said, like John F. Kennedy saying "I did not inhale." The usual way to 
prevent such falsification has been to record the video under controlled 
circumstances and thereafter keep it continuously under guard until it is used 
as evidence. Unfortunately, amateur videos do not have this protection, and 
professional videos are often made and guarded by parties, e.g. police, who 
are far from disinterested, and who therefore may be suspected of having 
falsified the video themselves. For example, in the O.J. Simpson murder 
trial, the police were accused of falsifying video and other evidence. A 
recent approach, obviating the need for guarded storage, is the use of a 
watermarking camera [3] that digitally signs and time stamps images as they 
are made. But this can be defeated by collusion with the camera 
manufacturer, or by physically tampering with the camera after manufacture.   
 
II. Time-bracketed authentication 
Time bracketed authentication [4] provides a way of making videos that 
remain trustworthy even if the manufacturer and operators of the video 
equipment are untrustworthy. It works by combining and improving two old 
ideas:  
• The kidnapper's trick of photographing a hostage holding today's 
newspaper to prove the hostage is still alive. We call this a past time 
bracket;  
• The inventor's practice of publishing an invention, or putting it in a 
self-addressed envelope and getting it postmarked, to prove the 
invention originated no later than a certain day. We call this a future 
time bracket. 
Both ideas both involve communication with an outside world beyond the 
control of the distrusted party: in the first case, information is imported from 
a place beyond the kidnapper's control; in the second case information is 
exported to a place beyond the inventor's control.  
  
 
In more detail (cf Fig. 1) time-bracketed authentication works by importing 
a stream of  unpredictable information from an trusted public source, or 
beacon [5] and using it to influence the scene being recorded, e.g. by having 
an LCD projector or laser near the camera illuminate the scene with a 
beacon-controlled texture or scan pattern. At frequent intervals, the most 
recent portion of the A/V data stream, compressed or uncompressed, which 
is about to be appended to the cumulative record on tape or other output 
medium, is compressed by the secure hash function h, and the resulting 
hashed digest exported to trusted repository, i.e. a public archive or other 
place beyond the control of any interested party.  This having been done, the 
videotape, or other digital record, need not be guarded or protected from 
subsequent manipulation, because if it were modified outside the short time 
interval between arrival of the beacon signal (which provides a past time 
bracket) and archiving of the first digest influenced by it (which provides a 
future time bracket), it would no longer match the archived digests. The only 
remaining opportunity for falsification is for the would-be falsifier to use a 
fast, real-time rendering program capable of simulating fake action, 
including the effect of the unpredictable beacon-controlled illumination, 
within the short time interval mentioned above. If the scene being 
videotaped includes a cooperative human subject or interviewee, the beacon 
signals can be caused to influence the scene in more complex ways, for 
example by directing the subject to perform, on camera, a action from a 
menu of possible actions, the timing and choice of the action being 
controlled by the beacon signal. The actions on the menu should be easy to 
perform, but hard to render (e.g. "touch your nose", "clap your hands"...) and 
might employ hard-to-render props ("blow some soap bubbles").   
Given a trusted beacon and trusted repository, the grounds for believing the 
past and future time brackets are rather different. The plausibility of the 
future time bracket follows simply from the presumed infeasibility of 
finding collisions under the hash function  h.  The past time bracket is more 
subtle, depending also on the presumed infeasibility of simulating 
(rendering) the beacon’s influence in real time.  If it were possible to do this 
simulation, the video recording, while matching all its archived digests, 
might still be a fake, made in a computer by pure animation or by 
manipulating prerecorded material in the manner of Video Rewrite.  Past 
time bracketing thus involves not only mathematics and computational 
complexity but also physics and perhaps even biomechanics and 
psychology.  
Future time bracketing by itself, proving that a document was not created or 
modified after a certain date, is already quite useful. Its theory was 
developed in classic papers of Haber et al on digital time stamping [6], and it 
is commercially available under the name “digital notary service”.  
The following section III explores the notions of beacon and repository and 
ways of implementing them in practice.  Section IV discusses ways of using 
one data modality (e.g. audio) at the scene being recorded to influence 
another (e.g. video) so as to further hinder the falsification of either.  Section 
V describes techniques for making authenticated recordings more discreet, 
that is resistant to being used for wrongful purposes such as harassment and 
blackmail, while retaining their value as evidence in legitimate 
circumstances.  Section VI describes how amateur videographers, who 
unexpectedly find themselves in a position to document an important event 
like the Rodney King beating, can apply the principles of time-bracketed 
authentication in an impromptu fashion to considerably improve the 
evidentiary value of their recordings.   
 III. Beacons, Repositories, and the Public/Private Interface  
In legal and official settings there has long been a notion of public 
information, or matters of public record, for example birth and death 
certificates and transcripts of legislative deliberations.   Such information is 
expected to be stable over time and accessible to everyone.  Its resistance to 
loss or alteration comes from being kept in a well-guarded location, or 
distributed widely to many places, or both.   In recent years the Internet, 
cheap storage, and efficient search engines have made publication and 
access to information much cheaper and faster. Sites such as www.arXiv.org 
undertake to provide a free permanent repository of scientific preprints. The 
similarly named site www.archive.org maintains snapshots of the entire 
publicly-accessible portion of the Web dating back to 1996.  Newsgroup 
postings dating back to the early 1980s appear set to remain permanently 
accessible through archive sites such as Google.groups. Of course a 
website's content can be changed, and an arXiv or newsgroup submission 
can usually be retracted ("nuked") by its originator, but if the change is at all 
controversial, it engenders a trail of comment, which itself becomes part of 
the public record, recoverable through search engines.   A famous example 
is the Pathfinder news site's accidental posting, for a few seconds, of a page 
erroneously announcing a guilty verdict in O.J. Simpson's murder trial [7].  
For an authenticated public record, of course, it is important that publication 
be permanent, with entries being neither retractible nor alterable by the 
originator or anyone else.  In this paper we consider a somewhat idealized 
world in which, for at least some identifiable types of information, a 
phenomenon of irreversible publication exists: what has once been 
published remains accessible ever afterward, and cannot be changed or 
deleted.  The invention of printing, and several centuries later, the 
proliferation of cheap digital storage media and the World Wide Web, have 
made this idealization closer to reality than it was in the ancient world, or 
even twenty years ago. 
Although much public information is meaningful and indeed carefully 
crafted by its originators, an important complementary feature of public 
information is that some of it is unpredictable and beyond anyone’s control.   
Low order digits in newspaper reports of financial or sports data, for 
example, are so unpredictable that bets are taken on them in the gambling 
game known as the numbers racket.   The distinctive feature of such 
information is that it is unknown and uncontrollable by anyone before a 
certain time, but shortly thereafter becomes universally accessible and 
unalterable.  Sources of unpredictable public information have proliferated 
on the Web, including live webcasts of sports events and live webcams (e.g. 
http://lemenille.com/traffic_cam_gwb.html depicting traffic at the George 
Washington Bridge in Fort Lee, New Jersey at one minute intervals).    
Irreversible publication, to the extent it exists today, is affected by social and 
legal factors, as well as technological ones.  While it is economically 
feasible for a website to publish and archive many megabytes of data per 
day, either locally generated or collected from outside submitters, such a site 
could not offer automatic permanent publication of all content submitted to 
it without worrying about copyright and libel. Existing archives and 
newsgroups typically require submitters to promise not to post libelous, 
infringing, or other types of objectionable material and they sometimes 
remove postings upon receiving a credible complaint that the policy has 
been violated.  However, if, for one reason or another, the data stream is 
known a priori to be non-objectionable, then the site could safely promise 
permanence.  For example, a traffic cam website can be reasonably 
confident that the data it publishes is unobjectionable (except perhaps to 
commuters during rush hour).  Either the original operator of a traffic site, or 
anyone else on the Web, could at little expense archive the traffic cam’s 
output, and make it available for later retrieval, when it might have 
evidentiary value, for example in the investigation of a traffic accident 
happening within view of the camera.   
If the aim of an archive is merely authentication, rather than publication of 
content, then a secure hash function can be used to guarantee that the 
postings, while useful for authentication, will not be objectionable. Hash 
functions have long been used [8] to attest the integrity digital documents 
and files and are central to the digital time-stamping techniques of Haber et 
al [6], where they are used to construct a chain or tree of hash values 
connecting any particular document to a master hash value placed into the 
public record, for example as a paid newspaper ad.  The chain itself would 
not necessarily be published, but would rather be given to the client, who 
could then authenticate document at will, without further cooperation of the 
time stamping service, by producing the document and the chain of hash 
values connecting it to the public record.  We will use hash functions in a 
slightly different way, taking into account the greater ease of publication in 
the Internet era.  Let a hash-and-publish (HAP) service be an agency or 
mechanism (e.g. an automated website) that takes client submissions s, 
applies a secure one-way hash function h, and publishes the hash value 
v=h(s), along with the time t it was submitted.  The random-seeming string v 
would have only a negligible chance of being objectionable, but would serve 
to authenticate the fact that s had been submitted, when and if, at some later 
time, the submitter wished to prove that fact.  The HAP would thus provide, 
not publication or nor even, strictly speaking, authentication, but rather an 
option to authenticate, exercisable at will by the submitter.  By using 
anonymous proxy techniques, submitters could access a HAP anonymously, 
without disclosing their identity.   Submitters, especially anonymous ones, 
would generally not want to send meaningful content to a HAP; instead they 
would first hash their content c to obtain a hash value s=h(v), which they 
would send to the HAP, who would then hash it again and publish the pair 
(v,t)=(h(s),t)=(h(h(c)),t).  The first hashing serves to protect the submitter 
from unwanted disclosure of meaningful content by a malicious or 
incompetent HAP; the second hashing, as described before, protects the 
HAP from inadvertently publishing objectionable material submitted by a 
malicious or incompetent submitter.   
A simple HAP-based distributed implementation of a trustworthy time-
stamping service would have the user, who wishes to authenticate a string s 
at time t, send it (anonymously, if desired) to each of several geographically 
and administratively separate HAPs.    Each HAP would each publish, e.g. 
by posting on a website publicly accessible forever afterward, the pair (t,v), 
where v=h(s). The posting and continued availability of the pair on the 
majority of the HAPs (that is, all but the dishonest or defective ones) would 
constitute evidence that s existed at time t and had not been modified 
afterward.   
 
As noted earlier time bracketed authentication needs not only a trusted 
repository, such as a set of independent HAPs, but a trusted source of public 
randomness, here called a random beacon.  In time bracketed authentication 
the beacon helps to frustrate postdating, but beacons have other uses, for 
example in synchronizing transactions and choosing lottery numbers.   The 
examples of the numbers racket and traffic cams have already been 
mentioned.  It is technically fairly easy to extract true random digits, 
approximating arbitrarily closely a sequence of ideal independent coin 
tosses, from probabilistic physical processes such as radioactive decay or 
noisy electrical circuits, and several such true random number generators, or 
TRGs, are commercially available.   Using one of these (or a home-made 
TRG if one distrusts the manufacturers) it would not be overly expensive to 
set up a beacon site that would generate and publish up to several thousand 
random bits per second, while maintaining a web-accessible archive of its 
previously emitted digits and their times of emission.  To deny itself the 
temptation to lie about past emissions, the site could allow itself to be 
mirrored elsewhere on the Web, have its output stream regularly time 
stamped [6], and/or publish the data in an offline nonvolatile medium such 
as an annual CD.   The main weakness of a beacon is not that it might lie 
about its past outputs, but rather that it is impossible in principle to convince 
outsiders, who did not participate in building and operating the beacon site, 
that the numbers it publishes are truly unpredictable, rather than being 
known long beforehand by a dishonest beacon operator and accomplices, 
who might take advantage of their insider information to defeat the 
cryptographic purposes of the beacon.   For a beacon to be useful for 
purposes such as lotteries or time bracketed authentication, not only the user, 
but the general public, must be confident of its fairness.  
 
A good way to protect against dishonest or defective beacons is similar to 
the technique recommended above for protection against defective  
HAPs—namely, one should use a number of geographically and 
administratively separate beacons.  If these beacons are well synchronized 
and spacelike separated (so they cannot influence one another) it suffices to 
take their XOR to obtain a bit stream that will be random and unpredictable 
if at least one of the contributing beacons is honest and properly functioning.  
In [5] we described how, with beacons that are not spacelike separated, and 
therefore potentially capable of influencing one another, one can still obtain 
a sequence that is at least partly unpredictable by timesharing among the 
beacons rather than XORing them.  A better solution is to have each beacon 
pre-commit, at each discrete time t, to the string it plans to emit at some 
future time t+δ, where δ is a fixed delay.   In more detail, such a 
precommitting random beacon (PCRB) at each discrete time t, generates a 
new random bit string r(t) of some suitable length (say 128 or 256 bits) 
using its TRG, and stores this string secretly and locally for later emission at 
time t+δ.  Meanwhile, at time t, the beacon pre-commits to r(t)  by emitting 
h(r(t)), where, as usual,  h denotes a one-way collision-free hash function.  
The full emission at time t is thus the triple (t, h(r(t)), r(t-δ)).   A typical 
Web-based implementation of a PCRB might post such triples every second 
of coordinated universal time where δ could be of the order of a few 
seconds.   The PCRB website would also be expected to keep its past 
emissions available online, allow itself to be mirrored or time stamped, and 
publish an offline backup in the form of an annual CD.  
 
To obtain beacon data more trustworthy than that coming from any one 
beacon, a user would, at each time, XOR together the emissions  
{ri : i=1…m} of several independent PCRBs of the sort just described, 
meanwhile checking for each one that its currently emitted random string 
ri(t-δ) agrees with the previously emitted commitment h(ri(t-δ)), and 
excluding from the XOR any beacon failing this test.    The resultant string  
r1⊕ r2⊕ r3…  will then be trustworthy if at least one of the PCRBs  on 
which it is based is honest and correctly functioning.  
 
PCRBs and HAPs are alike in that they are services functioning at the 
public/private interface whose reliability can be increased by having users 
combine multiple geographically and administratively separate suppliers of 
the service.  Nonperformance by a HAP would be easy to detect, if not 
prevent, and would consist either of its failing to hash and publish in a 
timely manner, or in its attempting to lie about its past emissions.   The latter 
fault could be neutralized by wide initial publication of the output stream, 
approximating the ideal of irreversible publication.  Nonperformance by a 
PCRB would include these detectable faults, but also the undetectable fault 
of producing data that is not unpredictable, and has been leaked secretly 
beforehand to accomplices.  
 
Since PCRBs’ and HAPs’ trustworthiness depends on multiplicity and  
administrative independence, they should be constructed using open source 
software and, in the case of a PCRB, open-source plans for building the 
hardware true random number generator (TRG) from widely available 
simple components such as discrete resistors, capacitors, and diodes.   This 
minimizes the chance that would-be operators of honest PCRBs will 
inadvertently build dishonest ones, for example by buying clandestinely 
sabotaged ready-made TRGs from a dishonest manufacturer.  To raise the 
small amounts of money needed to operate their websites, while maintaining 
administrative independence from any central authority, operators of PCRBs 
and HAPs might solicit voluntary donations or sell advertising to be 
displayed to website visitors and users. 
 
A well constructed time-bracketed authentication (TBA) system would 
consist of a video camera or other recording equipment communicating in 
real time with several of independent PCRBs and HAPs.  The incoming 
signals from the PCRBs would be XORed together as described above to 
generate the trusted random influences (challenges) called for by the TBA 
protocol.  Meanwhile the stream of hash digests generated by the TBA 
protocol would be sent to a multiple HAPs, where they would be hashed 
again and published. 
 
IV. Coupling Data Modalities to Hinder Falsification 
Some data modalities (e.g. audio) are easier to falsify than others (e.g. 
video).  This can seriously impair the evidentiary value of audiovisual 
recordings where, for example, the sound track of a videotaped police 
interview might be susceptible to replacement (or allegations of 
replacement) by another sound track with entirely different meaning.  This 
can be prevented to some extent by showing close-ups of the speakers’ faces 
and mouths during spoken testimony, in effect using lip-reading to validate 
the correctness of the soundtrack.  But this approach is difficult to 
implement if there are multiple persons speaking out of turn, and even if a 
clear view of the subject’s mouth is available, it is often possible to find a 
visually similar phrases with quite different sound and meaning. When 
popular American TV shows are adapted for broadcast in Germany, audio 
track editors have been quite successful in finding German dialog which 
approximates the meaning of the English, and which, when spoken by 
trained German voice artists, appears to be in good synch with the original 
video track of American actors speaking English.   
 
To obtain greater resistance to falsification, even in situations where the 
speakers’ faces are not in view, we propose linking the audio with the 
harder-to-falsify video, by using light sources whose intensity, color, or 
position is modulated by the audio signal to provide some, but not all, of the 
light illuminating the scene.  In police interviews and other similar 
adversarial situations, the visible modulation of the illumination in response 
to the speech of all the participants would give each participant some 
assurance that the audio signal being recorded corresponds to what they are 
actually saying.    This technique, which we call audio modulated 
illumination (AMI) could be used in a standalone fashion, or in conjunction 
with time-bracketed authentication to further hinder falsification of the 
audiovisual recording. 
 
When used in a standalone fashion, audio-modulated illumination would 
yield a video track containing visible evidence of the soundtrack, mixed in a 
complicated and hard-to-render fashion with non-audio-modulated 
illumination.  For example, in one experiment with this technique, the 
speaker’s voice varied the brightness of an incandescent lamp in the 
foreground, casting time-dependent highlights and shadows, while other 
parts of the scene, illuminated by light from an open window, remained at 
constant brightness. 
 
When used in conjunction with time bracketed authentication, the audio 
signal could be used to control some features of the illumination, while the 
external random challenges from one or more beacons would be used to 
control others.  A very simple way to do this would be to turn on an ordinary 
radio receiver during a recording session illuminated by AMI.  The 
illumination would then respond both to the speakers’ voices and the outside 
radio signal, which, if the broadcast were live rather than prerecorded, would 
serve as a beacon.  This would combine the advantages of time-bracketed 
authentication (reducing the time available for falsification) with those of 
audio-modulated illumination (giving the participants confidence, even 
during the recording session itself, that the audio was being recorded 
correctly and not being secretly replaced by other audio).   
 
 More generally the technique of using a more easily falsifiable data 
modality to influence a less easily falsifiable one can be used in any situation 
where one wishes to make a trustworthy multimodal recording, with or 
without TBA, but where one of the data modalities is dangerously easy to 
falsify on its own.  A typical example would be an industrial process, where 
time-varying sensor data such as temperatures in different parts of the plant, 
(which of course could be falsified relatively easily if they were recorded 
solely in a separate data track) would also be used to modulate the 
illumination of the video track in a complex and hard-to-falsify manner. 
 
 
V. Enhancing discretion of authenticated recordings against improper 
use or disclosure 
While people generally recognize the value of surveillance videos for 
deterring and prosecuting wrongdoing, there is also great concern that 
pervasive surveillance, or even the proliferation of amateur videographers, 
could lead to harassment and blackmail of people for things they get 
recorded doing that are not wrong or illegal, but merely embarrassing, or 
properly regarded as nobody’s business but their own.   This becomes all the 
more true if the video or other recording is made in a less than public venue, 
where one or more participants has a legitimate expectation of privacy.  The 
issue is the subject of established legislation and precedent in the case of 
recordings of phone conversations, and the question of privacy of email is 
also an active topic of discussion.  Broadly speaking one can say that in any 
setting, there will be an expectation, which may be codified legally, of some 
level of privacy and access rights depending both on the place and on the 
persons present.  For example, in a bank or casino one expects one’s actions 
and speech to be watched and recorded.  In one’s own home, conversely, 
one expects there will be no surveillance without a court order.  Likewise, in 
a two-way telephone conversation the expectation is that barring a court-
ordered wiretap the conversation will be private unless both parties consent 
to the recording. 
To continue with the example of a telephone conversation, it may happen 
that, after the fact, both parties wish that a recording had been made, for 
example to help resolve a dispute over what they said, or to prove to a third 
party that they said some particular thing.   The ability to generate such a 
recording after the fact, but only if both parties agree, can be approximated 
cryptographically, by setting up the telephone equipment to automatically 
make an encrypted recording of all conversations, using a separate random 
encryption key for each conversation, and dividing the encryption key into 
two shares (using the well known technique of secret sharing), one of which 
would be given to each participant in the conversation.  The encrypted 
recording would be given to both participants, but it could only be decrypted 
if both parties consented, which is the same as the condition presently 
prevailing for making an unencrypted recording in the first place.  
Using this kind of cryptographic protection it would be possible, and not 
technically difficult, to implement a more discreet form of authenticated 
surveillance, whereby encrypted (and if desired TBA-authenticated) 
recordings would be routinely made in various situations (e.g. phone 
conversations, airport lobbies, street corners, diplomatic negotiating 
sessions), in each case with an access structure, enforced by secret sharing, 
corresponding to people’s codified expectations of privacy.  When used with 
TBA as in Figure 1, the digital tape at the center right would have been 
automatically encrypted by the equipment producing it, so unless the 
equipment had been tampered with, no unencrypted version of the data 
would remain.  The same equipment would generate the requisite shares of 
the encryption key and distribute them to all parties having rights to 
participate in the decision of whether to decrypt the tape.  The parties 
involved in this secret sharing need not be static.  Using short range radio 
transponders similar to those used in automatic toll plazas, one could even 
set up an authenticated conversation room where the access structure would 
change dynamically according to who was in the room: all conversations 
would be recorded, but no portion of the recording could be opened except 
by consent of all people in the room at the time.  The same dynamic access 
control could be implemented even more easily in a multi-way telephone 
conversation.  In any of these situations, the access structure could be set up 
to allow the usual quorum to be overruled by a court of sufficiently high 
authority.   
 
VI. TBA-Lite, a  version of Time Bracketed Authentication suitable for 
amateur videographers and other impromptu users 
It is anticipated that time bracketed authentication, with the various 
improvements described above, will one day be routinely used by 
professionals in settings requiring authentication, such as police interviews, 
courtroom testimony, surgical procedures, and formal negotiating sessions.  
Such professional users will presumably use a commercially supplied system 
consisting of hardware and software designed to automatically link with 
available PCRBs and HAPs,  apply the beacon-supplied signals to influence 
the a/v recording according to the TBA protocol, thereby producing hard-to-
fake recordings under the particular conditions of use.   Another category of 
professional users, including photojournalists and police on patrol, would 
use a more versatile kind of professional TBA system designed to adapt at a 
moment’s notice to a variety of operating conditions, indoor and outdoor, 
with different ambient light and sound levels.  
However, a third important arena for application of these ideas would be in 
informal settings, by amateur videographers and others who have no special 
equipment beyond a standard consumer camcorder, digital or film still 
camera, or audio tape recorder (plus other widely available equipment such 
as a TV or radio receiver and a personal computer with standard 
business/personal software), but who unexpectedly find themselves at the 
right time and place to document something important.   These amateur 
users, who function essentially as impromptu photojournalists, can still 
apply the principles of time bracketed authentication, and the result will be a 
video or other recording which, while not of professional quality, will still 
provide much greater evidentiary reliability than if it had simply been 
recorded and put in a drawer.  To do take advantage of TBA principles, it 
suffices for the amateur videographer to use available equipment in a way 
that creates a past and future time bracket sufficiently close together in time 
that it is unlikely that the recording could have been significantly 
manipulated in the intervening time.  As noted earlier, the past time bracket 
involves information flowing in from the outside world, beyond the control 
of the videographer, and influencing the video in a way that would be hard 
to fake quickly.  The future time bracket involves exporting the video 
recording itself, or a digital hash of it, to the outside world beyond the 
control of the videographer.  
 
For sufficiently large newsworthy events, such as earthquakes and train 
wrecks, the event provides its own past time bracket: the event was 
unexpected and unpredictable at the time it happened, but soon afterward 
news of it, including hard-to-fake details such as the collapse of particular 
buildings, pass into the public domain beyond the control of the 
videographer or other personnel at the scene.  In other less momentous 
situations, for example an interview with a person not publicly known to 
have been at a particular place at a particular time, a deliberately generated 
past time bracket is advisable to establish that the recording was not made at 
some earlier time.   An easy way to do this is to use a radio or TV receiver 
tuned to a live (and therefore unpredictable beforehand) broadcast of news, 
weather, traffic conditions, or sports, any of which can serve as an 
improvised beacon.  To avoid the problem of sound tracks being relatively 
easy to substitute without changing the video, the TV receiver could be 
turned so as to illuminate, or create reflections in, objects in the scene being 
recorded.  Alternatively, if there is a human subject, he/she could be asked to 
react visibly in real time to the content of the TV/radio broadcast, for 
example applauding whenever his/her favorite sports team scores a point.   
To establish a future time bracket it is sufficient to quickly place the 
videotape or other recording (eg audiotape, still photograph), or preferably 
several copies of it, into the public arena (eg by mailing it to the offices of 
one or more independent news media), where it can no longer be modified 
by the videographer or other interested parties.  This approach can be used 
both with modern digital recordings and with the formerly widely used 
analog formats such as film cameras, still or video, and analog electronic 
audiotape or videotape.  It has the disadvantage of requiring that a somewhat 
bulky and perhaps incriminating or irreplaceable material object, such as a 
videotape cassette or a roll of exposed film, be shipped quickly out of the 
battle zone into a safe place, away from the interested parties.   If, on the 
other hand, the video or other recording is made in, or subsequently 
converted to, a digital format, and if the videographer has access to a 
personal computer, it suffices for the videographer to send a hash of it into 
the public arena.  This can be done through almost any means of 
communication, even those available to civilians under wartime conditions.  
For example, if neither mail service nor telephone nor Internet were 
available, an amateur videographer, having clandestinely recorded evidence 
of a war crime in progress, could bury the original videotape in a secret 
location for later retrieval in safer times.  But to establish a future time 
bracket, he/she could take a 64 bit (16 hex digit) hash of the video file, print 
a thousand copies of it on little slips of paper, and scatter these anonymously 
around the neighborhood or disperse them in the wind.  Subsequent 
testimony by many people that the slips had been found on a certain date 
would establish that the videotape, although it might not be dug up until 
much later, must have been made before the date of discovery of the slips.   
Or the hash code, perhaps further truncated or converted to a more easily 
memorable mnemonic phrase or alphanumeric character string, could be 
propagated as an anonymous word-of-mouth rumor, with the admonition 
that it ought to be remembered and spread until it reached the outside world, 
because it preserves the evidentiary value of a buried videotape.  The people 
spreading the rumor would not need to know sensitive information like the 
identity of the videographer or the location of the buried tape. 
Under typical conditions the amateur techniques we have described, which 
we call TBA-Lite, would serve to bracket the time with a matter of minutes 
or hours.  Professional time bracketed authentication, with connection via 
the Internet to PCRBs and HAPs and dedicated hardware and software 
implementing the TBA protocol, would of course create a much narrower 
time bracket on the order of a few seconds, or even less if the connection to 
the PCRBs and HAPs were made via radio rather than through the Internet. 
However, even a one-day time bracket considerably reduces the scope of 
plausible falsification, beyond what it would be if no effort were made to 
apply time-bracketing principles.   
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